In December 1976, the State of South Dakota petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. to extradite a convicted fugitive from South Dakota. In South .Dakota v. Brown, the court denied that petition and held that the gubernatorial duty to extradite a convicted felon and fugitive from a sister state was incapable of judicial enforcement. The court, adopting a tone of judicial self-restraint, only peripherally examined the constitutional separation of powers question actually resolved in the case. In its central line of analysis, the court instead embarked on an ill-conceived construction of the statute in question, the California Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.Z By framing the issue of judicial enforcement as exclusively one of statutory interpretation, the court departed from established California precedent requiring the issuance of mandamus to the executive branch in appropriate cases.
This Note focuses on the Brown court's analysis of the issue of state COJ.Irt enforcement of the gubernatorial extradition duty imposed by the Extradition Act. It examines the court's construction of the Act, as well as the court's lnitial decision to frame the basic question addressed as solely one of statutory interpretation. The conclusion reached is that the Brown court's analysis is a product of result-oriented judicial reasoning. This Note does not address the court's handling of enforcement of the federally imposed duty 3 nor the theoretical justifications for gubernatorial discretion in extradition of interstate fugitives.
The facts of the case are straightforward. After a jury trial in the Seventh· Judicial Circuit of South Dakota on July 25th and 26th of 1975, Dennis Banks was convicted of riot while armed with a dangerous weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon without intent to 1. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978) (Richardson, J.) (5-l decision). The supreme court, reversing a unanimous court of appeal, denied South Dakota's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the governor to extradite Dennis Banks and discharged the writ issued by the court of appeal in South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977) . South Dakota applied directly to the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The supreme court transferred the petition to the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § § 1547-1558 (West 1970) (hereinafter referred to in the text as the Extradition Act).
3. In concluding that the federally imposed extradition duty is not enforceable by a California court, the Brown court relied heavily on Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861) , and In re Manchester, 5 Cal. 237 (1855) . Much of this Note's criticism of the court's unsound reliance upon these two cases in the context of the state imposed duty is also relevant to the court's analysis of the federal context. See text accompanying notes 13-36 infta. 4 . S.D. COiviPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-i0-5 (aggravated riot) and § 22-i8-i.l(2) (aggravated assault). These sections in their present form are part of the 1976 revisions to the South Dakota Criminal Code. The relevant Code sections in force at the time Dennis Banks was tried and convicted were the prerevision versions of § 22-10-5 (riot while aTITJed) and § 22-18-11 (assault without intent to kill but with intent to injure) which were repealed as part of the 1976 revision.
5. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Acting upon an opinion by Attorney General Randolph that the extradition clause was not self-executing, the United States Congress in 1793 passed implementing legislation which is found in its current version at 18 U.S.C. § § 3181-3195 (1969) . A brief history of this legislation is contained in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM CRiiviiNAL EXTRADITION ACT [ll U.L. A. 52 (West 1974) Manchester, 5 Cal. 237 (1855); People v. Millspaw, 257 App. Div. 40, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1939 ), m''d on ot!Jer grounds, 281 N.Y. 441, 24 N.E.2d I 17 (1939 Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128, 171 P. 577 (1918) ; Ex parle Waliace, 38 Wash. 2d 67, 227 P.2d 737 (1951) .
that the absence of specific enforcement procedures in both the extradition clause of the United States Constitution and its implementing legislation necessarily precluded enforcement of the federal duty in Brown.
After disposing of the federal duty on enforceability grounds, the court considered the duty imposed upon the governor by the Extradition Act. Primarily on the basis of a lengthy interpretation of the Act, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the present statute, or its precursors, authorized judicial enforcement of the governor's extradition duty. Two elements dominated this interpretational analysis: (I) an examination of the source and historical development of the state's first extradition statute, which was enacted in 1851; and (2) a survey of what the court termed the "general tenor" of the various provisions of the present Extradition Act. The court buttressed its conclusion that the Act creates no judicially enforceable gubernatorial duty to extradite with the observation that this interpretation accords with the practices of the last five California governors, and is supported by considerations of public policy. Finally, the majority concluded that while the court could not compel the governor to extradite, it could require some gubernatorial action within a reasonable time.
Since the court focused its inquif'j upon a two-pronged examination of the Extradition Act, the elements of that analysis merit careful consideration in evaluating the Brown opinion as a whole.
II THE LANGUAGE OF THE CALIFORNIA EXTRADITION ACT
To support its construction of legislative intent, the Brown majority relied principally upon the language of Ca11forn1a's current Extradition Act. Like its precursors, it conforms closely to the wording of the extradition clause of the United States Constitution.
9 After the adoption in 1851 of the federal language as part of California's first extradi-9. Section 1549.2 of the current California Uniform Criminal Extradition Act reads: If a dema.n,d conforms to the provisions of this chapter, the Governor or agent authorized in writing by the Governor whose authorization has been filed with the Secretary of State shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the State Seal, and shall be directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may entrust with the execution thereof. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1549 .2 (West 1970 tion statute, the federal extradition dause was interpreted as incapable of judicial enforcement against a state governor, despite its ostensibly mandatory nature.
10 'fhe Brown court argued that since the California legislature did not materially alter the statute's language following announcement of these decisions, the limitations grafted by the courts onto the federal extradition clause must have been intended by the legislature to be incorporated in the Cal!fomia statute and its successors.
In concluding that the language of the statute had not been materially altered, the court was unimpressed by the adjustments which the legislature did in fact make in the wording of the Extradition Act, distinguishing it from the federal model. In adopting the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in 1937, the legislature modified the Uniform Act by changing "if the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest" 11 to "[i]f a demand conforms to the provisions of Hils chapter, the Governor . . . shall sign a warrant of arrest."
12 Nonetheless, the .Brown court concluded that the legislature, in enacting the Extradition Act, :intended a discretionary rather than mandatory gubernatorial obligation to extradite fugitives from other states. 'fo arrive at this result, the court misused two authorities.
A. The Court's Reliance on Kentucky v. Dennison
'fhe first case that the .Brown court misused was KentuckJ' v . . Dennison, 13 which held that a federal court could not issue mandamus to compel extradition by a state governor.
14 'fen years prior to Dennison, California had adopted its original extradition statute, 15 which cast the gubernatorial duty in language essentially conforming to the federal extradition clause. 16 'fhe .Brown court reasoned that the California legislature's failure, subsequent to DerttztSorz, to alter the language of the lH'vtr"JJr1!~t1n.n fs,-.1} 'll"":r"11llliC"V .;~11""'t.hr +h,.,.,+ +1--,. on federal courts. Such an implication, however, is not reasonable in light of the scope of the Dennison decision.
In Dennison, the State of Kentucky sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor of Ohio to extradite a fugitive from Kentucky charged with the crime of inducing and assisting a runaway slave. The Governor of Ohio had refused extradition on grounds that the crime charged was neither a crime in Ohio nor an offense "already known to the common law and to the usage of nations."
17 Chief Justice Taney, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, denied the writ in spite of the language of the Act of 1793-the federal statute implementing the extradition clause-stating that "it shall be the duty of the executive ·au-thority of the state ... to cause the fugitive to be delivered."
18 In assessing this language, Taney specifically noted that the terms used would nornially create a mandatory and enforceable duty. He interpreted the legislative phrase "it shall be the duty" to "imply the assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience."
19 Taney then reached the extraordinary conclusion, however, that Congress, motivated by federalist concerns, had intended these words in the Act of 1793 to be merely "declaratory" of "moral duty." "[t] here is serious question whether the rigid federalism of Dennison would be followed today when a constitutional issue is involved. The high court has not hesitated to order state and local officials to comply with constitutionally required school desegregation." 20 Cal. 3d at 781 n.l, 576 P.2d at 484 n.l, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.l (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
22. The Brown court noted that, in altering the California extradition statute in 1872 and in 1937, the legislature did not explicitly refute .Dennison. Consequently, the court reasoned, the statute should be interpreted as incorporating a limitation on state court enforcement similar to that set forth in .l)ennison on federal court enforcement. 20 Cal. 3d at 771-74, 576 P.2d at 1ogic. 23 The lack of specific California legislative response to this decision should therefo:re be interpreted to indicate Dennison's irrelevance to the issue of state judicial authority to compel state executive action. Particularly in light of the well-established federal constitutional principle that questions of intrastate separation of powers are beyond the reach of federal courts, 24 the Brown court's contrary understanding is unreasonable.
The illogic of the inference of legislative intent regarding Dennison drawn in Brown can be further demonstrated by noting Dennison's treatment of the statutory language in the Act of 1793. The opinion explicitly states that the language in question-"it shall be the duty"-implied a power of compulsion when used in "ordinary legislation." From the context, this appears to refer to legislation which does not concern the balance of power between the federal and state governments. The court also noted that the word "duty" used in the Act of 1793 "points to the obligation of the State to carry it [the governor's extradition duty] into execution"-an apparent concession to state government authority in the area of enforcement. In short, the Court in Dennison clearly indicated that the source of its limitation on federal court enforcement was the federal-state context and not the federal language itself. Thus, contrary to the inference drawn by the Brown majority, the Californ1a legislature would not reasonably have concluded that the Dennison limitation was inherent in the federal language. No specific :repudiation should have been necessary on the part of the legislature to avoid sanctioning the .Dennison limitation with its adoption and retention of federal language.
The California Penal Code provides additional support for the argument against an inference of legislative intent to adopt the Dennison limitationa _A._ principle of statutOij' construction codified in Penal Code section 5 in 1872, and cited by the majority in Brown, states: "The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments." 25 Because the language at issue in Brown was originally adopted -in 1851, well before the announcement of Dennison in 1860, and since the 1872 and 1937 extradition statutes were, as the Brown court argues, 26 "substantially the same" as the 1851 statute in their use of language taken from the federal Constitution, JPenal Code 23. The section of the case considering the mandamus question focused almost exclusively on discussion of the states' rights aspect of the problem. The absence of an explicit enforcement provision in the Act of 1793 was referred to in only a single sentence of the opinion. 65 U.S. at 107.
24. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., in U.S. 210 (1908 The second case upon which the Brown majority relied was In re Manchester. 27 The case was used both as authority for the proposition that California courts cannot enforce the federal constitutional obligation to extradite, and to support the unenforceability of the apparently mandatory terms of California's Extradition Act. The problems resulting from the court's misuse of Manchester are compounded by its contention that since post-Manchester legisla~ive amendments to the Extradition Act did not seek to overturn the case, the state legislature supported a discretionary rather than mandatory interpretation of the governor's extradition responsibilities.
In re Manchester, however, is insufficient authority for the argument advanced by the Brown court. Written by Chief Justice Murray in i 855, the opinion takes up scarcely two pages in the official California Reports. Furthermore, it only fleetingly addresses the proposition which the Brown court considers central to this controversy. The Brown court's treatment of this isolated phrase as a bar to enforcement of a state created extradition duty is unsound for a 27. 5 Cal. 237 (1855) . In re Manchester dealt with a challenge under federal law to the incarceration of a fugitive pursuant to a gubernatorial extradition warrant. The case held that the court can examine the validity of the state chief executive's warrant of extradition under habeus corpu& and that such a warrant may be supported by a requisition from a demanding state which: (I) charges a crime but does not set forth the offense in the detail required by an indictment and (2) states that the person sought committed a crime and then fled but does not use the words "fugitive from justice." Id. at 238-39. The court also held that the demanding governor's certification was adequate authentication of the requisition and that the court would not look beyond the governor's certification in judging the authenticity of the requisition and its supporting papers.
28. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 67:643 number of reasons. First, the statement itself mistakes substaniive law. If the italicized portion of the quote is recast in the form of a syllogism, the major premise is that courts cannot control executive discretion, the minor premise is that extradition is a discretionary duty, and the conclusion is that the courts therefore cannot compel extradition.
The major premise was by 1855 and remains today a commonplace principle under both the federaF 9 and California 3° Constitutions. Manchester's unstated but necessary minor premise, however, commands far less support. The .Brown court of appeal decision stated explicitly that Manchester was an exception to the uniform characterization in California case law of the governor's extradition duty as nondiscretionary; 31 the .Brown supreme court decision noted that cases subsequent to Mandzester had characterized the duty as mandatory. 32 The contention that this JWanchester premise is an erroneous characterization of both the federal and state imposed extradition obligations is supported by a long line of both· federaP 3 and California 34 cases.
gation was nonetheless unenforceable. This conclusion resulted in de facto gubernatorial discretion in extradition matters; the reasoning in Manchester, to the contrary, concluded that the duty was unenforceable because it was de jure discretionary. was not comfortable itself with Manchester's characterization of the gubernatorial duty.
The erroneous nature of this characterization, which formed the minor premise of the syllogism outlined above, necessarily destroys the force of that syllogism and thus invalidates the reasoning of the court in Manchester concerning enforcement of the governor's extradition duty. Consequently, the Brown court could not soundly rely on Manchester as authority for a rule barring enforcement of extradition.
A secbnd difficulty with the Brown court's reliance on Manchester stems from the ambiguity in the Manchester court's intended scope of reference. It is unclear from Chief Justice Murray's opinion whether his statement concerning judicial authority refers solely to the court's lack of power to compel the federal obligation, or extends as well to the California statutory obligation. As a general proposition concerning judicial authority, it seems to refer to both. Only federal law was at issue in the case, however, and the opinion never referred to the state extradition statute enacted four years before.
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Finally, it is noteworthy that the Manchester court's statement regarding judicial power of compulsion to extradite is dictum. The power to compel was not at issue in Manchester, nor was it an essential element of the two major issues presented: judicial authority under writ of habeus corpus and the standard of sufficiency utilized to evaluate a challenged warrant requisition.
For these reasons, the Brown court's reading of Manchester is both precedentially and analytically inappropriate. The significance of this misreading of Manchester is twofold. First, as noted earlier, the m~jor ity's use of the case provided an essential step in its construction of the Extradition Act. The court reasoned that if a rule barring enforcement of a state-created duty had been clearly established by Manchester, then the legislature's failure to indicate a purpose to depart from that established rule in subsequent statutory enactments (ie., the enactments of the 1872 and 1937 extradition statutes) demonstrated intent to maintain and incorporate the established rule. A close reading of Manchester demonstrates, however, that no such inference should be drawn from legislative silence. Moreover, a legislative purpose to adopt a judicially enforceable right no longer appears to be a radical departure from established law once Manchester's proper scope is understood. Thus, the Brown court's interpretation of the Extradition Act is seriously flawed. 
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HI THE "GENERAL TENOR" OF THE EXTRADITION AcT lln the second phase of its two-pronged analysis, the Brown court attempted! to demonstrate that the "general tenor" of the Extradition Act provides for de jure executive discretion rather than judicially imposed mandatory performance. To this point in its analysis, the court appeared to accept the traditional characterization of a de jure mandatory, but nonetheless unenforceable, duty. 37 With its assessment of the tenor of the Extradition Act, however, the court recharacterized, without explanation, the duty as de jure discretionary. This characterization not only departs from established California precedent, 38 but also raises supremacy clause questions of conflict with federal law which has uniformly stipulated a mandatory duty. 39 The court, though, may well have insulated its decision from this potential infiTmity by advancing the principle of state court enforcement authorization, which, as a matter of state separation of powers, is not a matter of federal concem. 40 Finally, by neglecting to assess the range of possible alternative readings of the admittedly ambiguous statute, the Brown court failed to choose in a principled manner among alternative constructions of the Extradition Act A fair assessmeni of these alternatives would lilk:ely have led to an opposite conclusion on the issue of the court's enforcement power.
Without doubt, a measure of statutory ambiguity is created by apparently conflicting provisions of the Extradition Act. On one hand, section ]548.1 ("it is the duty of the Governor to have arrested and deliver up" any requested fugitive) 41 and section 1549.2 ("[i]f a demand conforms to the provisions of this chapter, the Governor . . . shall sign a "vvarrant of arresf';7) 42 appear to speak in clear mandatory tones. On 37. See note 35 supra. The distinction, whlch is admittedly a fine one, is hetwe~n de facto discretion resulting from judicial unenforceability and unenforceability resulting from de jure discretion. In reviewing the Extradition Act, the CO]Jrt stated "[i]t is lilcely that the Legislature chose to frame the obligation to e;ctradite in mandatory terms in order to avoid the appearance of inconsistency with prior federal and state law, a..TJd to emphasize the Governor's hlgh obligation to carry out the extradition laws." Id. at 774, 576 P.2d al 479, 144 CaL Rptr. at 764. in dosing, the court again noted that the extradition "duty may be considered mandatory in nature. The Brown court resolved this conflict by concluding that the discretionary sections dominated the mand~tory provisions. This resolution rejected alternative interpretations offered by the State of South Dakota. First, the court refused to limit section 1548.3 to authorizing investigations of only the formal sufficiency of extradition papers, on the ground that such a limitation would render the clauses "situation and circumstances of the person" and whether he "ought to be surrendered" to be but "pure surplusage." 45 Sitnilarly, the warrant revocation powers of section 1554 were found to have broader scope than mere reference to situations where a Governor's warrant was either no longer necessary or formally defective, since confining the clause in this manner "strains the statutory language." 46 Neither, argued the court, should the authorization of the clause be confined to cases of extradition to California (thus excluding a governor's ability to revoke warrants extraditing.from the state), since this would make the sequential placement of section 1554 within the Act "odd" and "unusual."
47 In thus opting for a dominating discretionary tenor, the court found the explicit grant of discretion in some other sections of the Act no barrier to interpreting the ostensibly mandatory phrasing of sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 as judicially unenforceable; and hence de facto discretionary.
The court's justifications for rejecting South Dakota's alternative interpretations are not analytically persuasive. First, a limitation of section 1548.3 to authorize only investigations of formal extradition request sufficiency need not create any "pure surplusage." The language of that section explicitly states that the investigation power granted therein relates to the governor's duties throughout the chapter, which in 43. Id. § 1548.3. The full text of § 1548.3 reads: When a demand is made upon the Governor of this State by the executive authority of another State for the surrender of a person so charged with crime, the Governor may call upon the Attorney General or any district attorney in this State to investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report to him the situation and circumstances of the person so demanded, and whether he ought to be surrendered according to the provision of this chapter. the «~amornia Penal Code constitutes the entire Extradition Act. 48 Moreover, section 1548.3 is the only section in the Act granting investigatory power. Within the Act, duties are imposed on the governor in both mandatoif 9 and discretionary 50 terms, varying with the factual context of the demand. Consequently, since it is the only source of investigatory power in the Act, section 1548.3 must provide a range of investigatory power broad enough to cover the spectrum of investigations which could be invoked under the provisions of the chapter. Although section 1548.3 does not specify any limitations, it need not be inferred that its entire :range of investigatory powers applies under every p:wvision of the Act. Thus, the court could have interpreted the discretionary language of section 1548.3 in a limited fashion, applicable in the openly discretionary provisions of the Act. Such an interpretation would neither have slighted the mandatory language of sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 nor have rendered the language of section 1548.3 extraneous.
Second, in rejecting a procedural limitation upon the warrant revocation powers of section 1554 as straining the statutory language, the court ignored the fact that all of the alternative constructions addressed by the court would have stretched the statutory language to varying degrees. Indeed, the rationale supplied by the court in making its choice among interpretations seems disingenuous, given the fact that the interpretation chosen by the court places a greater burden upon the language of both sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 than the rejected altemative. The chosen construction-finding the mandatory language to be discretionary--constitutes a substitution of judicial language for that used by the legislature; it gives the words of both sections meanings completely different from their normal legislative import. 51 The rejected construction of section 1554 7 on the other hand, would merely have limited the language actually chosen by the legislature. statutory language is misinformed. Undermining this estimate is the fact that fifteen other sections of the Act separate section 1554 from section 1548.3, many of which are unrelated to the issuance or recall of the governor's warrant to extradite a person from California. Additionally, the court failed to note that section 1554 immediately precedes that section of the Act dealing with war:mnts demanding extradition to California. As Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissent, section 1554 is numbered compatibly with section 1554.1, which specifically addresses the topic of warrants requisitioning the return of fugitives to California. 52 Furthermore, these two sections were once part ofthe same statute which stipulated that section 1554 referred solely to such requisitioning warrants.
53 These factors, ignored by the .Brown court, demonstrate that the evidence concerning the sequential import of the statutory sections is, at best, conflicting. On the basis of this suspect ground, the court nevertheless adopted an interpretation which prescribed the substitution, rather than the limitation, of statutory language.
The Brown court would have achieved a more satisfactory construction of the Extradition Act by resolving the Act's ambiguities in a manner which comported more closely with accepted principles of statutory construction. As both commentators and courts have pointed out, the power to construe mandatory language as discretionary is "dangerously liable to abuse, and one which should be most carefully guarded in its exercise." 54 The doctrine of restraint was well articulated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in an early case involving statutory construction:
This mode-of getting rid of a statutory provision by calling it directory is not only unsatisfactory on account of the vagueness of the rule itself, but it is the exercise of a dispensing ·power by the courts which approaches so near to legislative discretion that it ought to be resorted to with reluctance, only in extraordinary cases, where great public mischief would otherwise ensue, or important private interests demand the application of the rule. . . . It is dangerous to attempt to be wiser than the law; and when its requirements are plain and positive, the courts are not called upon to give reasons why it was enacted. A judge should rarely take upon himself to say that what the legislature have required is unnecessary. 55 Thus, the Brown court's objective should have been the articulation of a construction which altered the language of the statute as little as possible. To that end, any of the implied limitations on sections 1548.3 and 1554 considered in Brown would have been preferable to the constructions ultimately adopted by the court.
A second principle of statutory construction mentioned but given no weight by the Brown court is the rule that " [w] here both mandatory and directory verbs are used in the same statute . . . it is a fair infer- 52. 20 Cal. 3d at 784, 576 P.2d at 485, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (Mask, J., dissenting § § 150-151, at 533 (2d ed. 1911) .
55. Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247, 258-59 (1871) .
ence that the legislature realized the difference in meaning, and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings." 56 The legislature applied both recognized mandatory language57 as well as recognized discretionary language 58 in the Extradition Act, thus strengthening the inference that the legislature used the two divergent modes purposefully. Application of this principle to Brown provides further support for the constructions of the Extradition Act rejected by the court, which would have emphasized the mandatory import of sections 1548.1 and 1549.2.
A third principle of statutory construction ignored by the Brown court relates to the possible supremacy clause problems raised by the court's definition of the gubernatorial duty as de jure discretionary. In the same context, federal law has defined this duty as mandatory. 59 The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that in cases of conflict, the federal provision controls and the conflicting state legislation is rendered invalid. 60 The California Supreme Court as recently as 1976, in an opinion by Justice Richardson, admonished that "courts have an obligation to construe statutes in a way as to avoid serious constitutional doubts" in relation to the federal Constitution. 61 A related canon of construction states that courts should presume a legislative intent to enact a constitutionally sound statute. 62 Justice Richardson's opinion h1 Brown, however, has imputed to the legislature of California an intent to contradict the ier:ms of the federal extradition clause and its implementing legislation. Although the result reached in Brown was framed as a function of state court enforcement authorization, the retention of mandatory characterizations of the gubernatorial duty under sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 would have avoided potential supremacy clause tensions, and therefore should have been adopted by the court.
][n sum, the court in Brown has chosen, from among several alternatives, the construction which most severely strains the language of the Extradition Act. Furthermore, it has selected the only construction Williams, 76 Idaho 173, 279 P.2d 882 (1955); People v. Bessenger, 273 App. Div. 19, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 392 (1947); Bailey v. Laurie, 373 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1977 ). 61. People v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 56, 550 P.2d 600, 608, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (1976 which requires the imputation of legislative intent to contradict federal law. In doing so, the court has violated established principles of statutory construction while failing to adequately substantiate the construction adopted.
IV STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION AND THE BROWN COURT

A. Judicial Authority: The Enforcement of Mandatory Gubernatorial
.Duties.
The majority in Brown was analytically ambivalent in proceeding to its desired result. The court initially accepted the traditionally established mandatory characterization of the gubernatorial extradition duty. 63 Toward the end of the opinion, however, the court argued that the legislature intended to create a discretionary duty. 64 The resulting inconsistency suggests more fundamental fallacies in the court's approach to the enforcement question than the errors of statutory construction and treatment of precedent previously discussed in this Note. The primary fallacy-which becomes apparent upon examination of California case law prior to Brown-lies in the court's failure to address adequately the constitutional dimension of the enforcement issue. Rather, the court, without discussion, chose to frame the issue solely in terms of statutory interpretation of the Extradition Act.
The primary obstacles in the court's path to denying the writ sought by South Dakota were two-fold: the traditional characterization of the extradition duty as mandatory unde:t;" both federal and California law, 65 and the California rule that mandatory gubernatorial duties are enforceable by writ of mandamus. 66 The Brown court handled the characterization problem by adhering to the mandatory label in some parts of the opinion, while treating the duty elsewhere in the opinion as discretionary and simply ignoring the problems raised by the discretionary definition.
The court skirted traditional notions of the enforceability of mandatory gubernatorial duties by developing a distinction between enforceable and unenforceable mandatory duties. In concluding that the governor's extradition duty was an unenforceable mandatory duty, the court relied almost exclusively on the absence of any legislative intent in the Extradition Act to authorize judicial enforcement. enfmceability of mandatory duties is derived not from the legislative intent concerning the proper role of the courts, but rather from the constitutionally prescribed role of the court in relation to the executive branch.
The court's approach revealed a rnisperception of the customary significance of the statute sought to be enforced in California cases analyzing the issue of judicial enforcement. This confusion stemmedc in part from the court's failure adequately to distinguish the distinct questions of judicial authority and executive duty posed in cases like Brown. In resolving such enforcement questions, the court normally seeks to discern a statutory definition of the obligation that the legislature intended to impose on the executive. 67 lln pursuing this task, interpretation of the statute creating the executive duty is quite logically a primary focus of judicial inquiry. The nature ofthe duty, once defined, is critical in the court's enforcement determination: mandatory or ministerial duties are traditionally held enforceable in California, while discretionary duties are not. 68 The source of the court's authority to enforce mandatory duties, however, is the principle of supremacy of law inherent in the constitutional framework of California government.69 H has not been found to depend on the legislature showing an intent that a mandatory duty be enforced by writ of mandamus. An early California case, often cited as authority for executive amenability to mandamus, fully explores the separation of powers dimension of the enforcement issue. In JWcCauley v. Brooks/ 1 the court's analysis of judicial authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the executive branch emphasized the California Consiiiution's provision for a separation of state governmental powers. 72 This principle of separa-tion,-however, was found by the court to be limited by the coordinate principle that no officer of the government is above the law. 73 In short, the principle of separation was seen as one of restricted rather than ·absolute independence of governmental branches. Though the McCauley case itself concerned issuance of a writ of mandamus to the state controller, the court addressed the governor's role in dictum. In matters involving discretion, the court said the governor "is independent of the other departments," 74 while in nondiscretionary areas, he "is subject, like every other citizen, to the law" 75 and hence may be compelled to act by the judi~?ial branch through the writ ofmandamus. 76 In supporting his analysis, Chief Justice Field relied upon other cases which were equally explicit in grounding court enforcement of mandatory gubernatorial duties in a constitutionally based notion of restricted separation of powers.
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Since McCauley, a number of California cases-none of which were distinguished or even discussed by the majority in .Brown-have held what McCauley stated in dictum, that the governor may be subject to a writ ofmandamus.
78 Some of these cases make explicit the constitutional basis for their holdings 79 and .regularly refer to McCauley as authority, thus implicitly reaffirming Chief Justice Field's supremacy of law and separation of powers reasoning. 80 In many cases, however, courts proceed directly from statutory interpretation for the purpose of defining the executive duty to a conclusion on enforcement. 81 The constitutiomiJ step has become so well established that the analysis is often truncated, and the constitutional basis not explicitly stated; Perhaps this is one explanation for the confusion exhibited by the majority of the .Brown court.
Thus, the .Brown court is unique not only in its reference to the Extradition Act as a source of enforcement authorization, but also in its failure to consider other sources. The first of these innovations seems merely misguided. The second, however-ignoring a source of en-forcement authorization that has been highlighted in a continuous 1lne of cases since JlfcCau!ejl-re.fl.ects a significant lack of candor on the court's part. 'Jhe opinion suggests a judicial sleight of hand that is compounded by the majority's failure to acknowledge its substantial departure from established California precedent. ][n essence, the.Brown court has carved out exceptions to both the sphere of court power delineated in the JlfcCaulq line of cases and the court's constitutionally granted mandamus jurisdiction. In doing so, it examined neither the pertinent cases nor the relevant constitutional provisions.
C .rrom Legislative Silence to Legislative Intent: The Unreasonable I'!ference in Brown
Another substantial weakness in the Brown opinion is the court's w.J.reasonable reliance upon legislative silence in discerning legislative. intent.
82 'Ihe court implicitly deferred to a presumed legislative definition of the appropriate balance of power between the judiciary and the executive in extradition matters. But the Brown majority failed to identify any evidence in either the Extradition Act itself or its legislative history that indicates that the legislature intended to address the issue of court enforcement in the Act. Quite simply, there is no such evidence. 'Io the contrary, as argued above, a close reading of Jlfanchester and Dennison demonstrates that those cases did not necessitate any response from the legislature. 83 The court nevertheless pe1·severed in seeking such an intent and consequently was compelled! to place undue significance upon legislative silence in its ill-conceived! statutory a~aly sis.
Reliance on legislative silence as a source of legislative intent has been characterized by a number of courts and cowmentato:rs as a highly suspect instrument of statutory construction and application. 84 ]Legislative failure to address an issue in explicit terms is susceptible to a number of inconsistent Inferences. Given the vagaries ofthe legislative process, the legislature may well have been unaware of the problem or too preoccupied with other areas of lawmaking to formulate a policy on the issue. 85 Alternatively, the legislature may have purposefully deferred to judicial resolution, or may have desired for any number of reasons to leave the matter unresolved.
86 'Jhe Brown court provided no
